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This paper studies insider privatization in transition economies. We show theoretically that the
underperformance of insider-privatized rms could be due to the manager-cum-owner's lack of in-
centives after privatization. A screening theory predicts that a rm's postprivatization incentives
increase with the rm's buyout price. The empirical results show that the buyout price decreases
with the degree of information asymmetry and that a rm's postprivatization performance increases
with the buyout price. We also nd that the performance of premium-paying rms converges with
that of private rms after privatization; in contrast, heavily discounted rms perform indistinguish-
ably from government-owned rms.1 Introduction
Insider privatization is one of the most widely observed forms of institutional transformation in
transition economies. In a typical insider privatization, the former manager purchases the rm
from the government. The practice has been widely documented in Russia (Boycko, Shleifer, and
Vishny, 1995; Blanchard and Aghion, 1996; Earle and Estrin, 1996), in many Eastern European
countries (Carlin and Aghion, 1996; Frydman et al., 1999), and in some Asian countries such as
Mongolia (Anderson et al., 1999) and China (Cao et al., 1999).
The record of insider privatization on improving performance, however, has not always been
positive. Earle (1998) nds that the performance of insider-privatized rms does not improve in
Russia. Using a sample of rms in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, Frydman et al. (1999)
nd that privatization has a greater eect on performance when outsiders buy the rm. Barberis
et al. (1996) show that privatization improves a rm's postprivatization performance only when
old managers are replaced by more capable ones during the privatization process. Lacking both the
necessary nancial and human capital for enhancing the performance of rms, insider privatization
is frequently found to be ineective (Frydman and Rapaczynski, 1994; Blanchard and Aghion, 1996;
Black et al., 2000).
In this paper, we provide a new explanation for why insider privatization may be expected to
fail in some cases. For two reasons, it could be that the new owners do not have good incentives
after privatization.
The lack of incentives could arise from the nature of one form of privatization contract designed
to overcome information asymmetries. One problem with insider privatization, which is an act that
transfers ownership from the original owner, the government, to the buyer, the manager, is that
information is asymmetric between the two parties (Frydman and Rapaczynski, 1994; Putterman,
1997). The ocial in charge of privatization usually does not have a sound way to assess how
valuable a rm will become after ownership is transferred to its manager. In contrast, the manager
possesses insider information about the rm's earnings potential. Government ocials cannot rely
totally on the manager's valuation of the rm, however, since there are substantial rewards for
understating the rm's value. It also is dicult to rely on the assessment of Certied Public
Accountants (CPAs) or some other objective third party since such services are underdeveloped
in transition economies (Black et al., 1999). A CPA's assessment is itself based on imperfect
information. Without any mechanism to reveal additional information about the rm's true value,
an ocial has to accept the price oered by the manager and leave him large rents.
1It is possible, however, that ocials could use a screening contract to elicit private information
from the manager about the rm's future protability. Such a screening contract could have two
parts: a buyout price and a contingent payment in the form of a claim on future rm prots by the
ocial. The screening contract is similar to the one developed by Laont and Tirole (1986), which
trades o between ex ante information revelation and ex post incentives. The nal contract either
is one in which the manager pays a high price for the rm and keeps most of the rm's future prot
stream or is one in which the manager pays a low price and must share any future prots with
the government. When an ocial shares the privatized rm's future prots, following a Chinese
proverb, we call it \privatization with a tail."1 In coming to a nal agreement, the seller oers a
menu of contracts to the buyer, and the buyer then chooses the terms of privatization and manages
the rm under the contractual terms after paying the buyout price. Although such a contract
maximizes the revenues of the seller, it reduces the eciency of rms that continue to share prots
after privatization, and would account for the poor postprivatization performance experienced by
some rms.
Alternatively, the incentive problems faced by the new owners after privatization may be traced
back to corruption. If the ocial were to ask the rm for a payment to her personal account, the
manager might be allowed to purchase the rm for a below-market, discounted price. If there were
no chance of being caught (and if there was neither any information asymmetry between the ocial
and the manager nor screening contracts), the manager would have full incentives for the rm's
future prots. However, if there was a chance of that the manager gets caught and be punished
for corruption, and if the probability of getting caught was greater the more discount the manager
received, the manager in this case would obviously face imperfect incentives.
Our paper investigates one of the largest privatization movements in the world: the privatization
of China's rural industry. As an important part of China's economic revival, rural industries, which
began as locally government-owned rms (Walder, 1995), produce nearly half of China's industrial
outputs. Since the mid-1990s, however, more than half of China's locally government-owned rms,
up to two million rms, have been privatized (Nyberg and Rozelle, 1999). Moreover, it has been
reported that almost all of these rms have been sold to insiders.
Although we have data on rms in only two coastal provinces, Jiangsu and Zhejiang, the data
provide a good laboratory to study insider privatization. According to our survey that included
more than 600 rms, 65 percent were privatized between 1993 and 2000. More than 90 percent of
1In Chinese, \with a tail" or \leaving a tail" mean that things are not completely done. Specically in this paper,
it means that privatization does not give the new owner full incentives, since the original owner, the government,
retains rights over future prots.
2the privatized rms were sold to their managers.2 On the basis of the record, we believe Eastern
China is a good place to study insider privatization. Moreover, although performance of some rms
have improved, many other rms perform poorly after privatization. In fact, there is still a hot
debate over the record of privatization in rural China (Du and Yuan, 2000; Li and Rozelle, 2000).
By drawing on our data, we test both whether the buyout price in
uences rm performance
postprivatization and whether information asymmetries aect the buyout price. Using performance
measures, we rst employ an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator to test for the eect of the
buyout price on performance. We found that as the price rises, the postprivatization performance
of a rm improves. While the nding is consistent with our hypothesis that ocials use screening
contracts to implement insider privatization, a number of potential econometric problems need to
be addressed before we can be condent with our results. After using a variety of methods to
control for the omitted variable bias, simultaneity bias and other econometric problems, we nd
that all of the empirical exercises robustly support the theoretical predictions: the buyout price
decreases with the degree of information asymmetry and a rm's postprivatization performance
increases with the buyout price. We argue that our results may oer one explanation of why not
all privatization in the initial period of transition has been successful.
Our data set also allows us to measure the magnitude of the impact of the buyout price on priva-
tized rms by comparing the performance of privatized rms with that of private and government-
owned rms. In the nal part of our empirical analysis, we nd that rms that pay low buyout
prices perform no better than government-owned rms. In contrast, rms that pay high buyout
prices catch up to the performance standards of private rms (and private rms are shown to
signicantly outperform government-owned rms).
Our paper has two limitations. First, we cannot denitively partition the in
uence of screening
from that of corruption. The main problem is that we do not have a good measure for corruption.
Second, we do not answer directly the question why China's rural ocials have depended so heavily
on insider privatization. It could also be that outsiders in China possess so little information about
these rural rms that buying them could be extremely risky investments. Likewise, insiders in
China may already have an overwhelming advantage. Because reforms to China's management
system in the rural sector have been unfolding since the mid-1980s, many income and control
rights had already been shifted to managers by xed lease contracts. Privatization in this case is
merely the shift of ownership of the rm's assets.
2Another survey of 16 villages in Wuxi County also shows that village-owned rms were exclusively sold to the
original managers (Kung, 1999).
3The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3
examines privatization trends in China and shows some primary ndings on the relationship between
the buyout price and performance. Section 4 lays out three possible theoretical explanations for
the observed facts. Section 5 provides more systematic tests of the theories. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
The data set used in this paper is from a survey we conducted with colleagues in 1998. The
survey concentrated on township enterprises (TEs) and private rms and focused on the period
from 1994 to 1997.3 We randomly sampled 168 enterprises in 15 counties in Jiangsu and Zhejiang
Provinces, two of China's most developed coastal provinces, one north of Shanghai and the other
south. Thirty-three out of the 168 rms were originally established as private rms (henceforth
private rms), and 135 were owned by the government (henceforth government-owned rms) in
1994.4 During the study period, only part of the government-owned rms (88 out of 135) were sold
o to private owners, or in our terminology became privatized rms. Both private and government-
owned rms (as of 1994) were included in the sample in order to ultimately allow us to test how
well privatized rms do relative to private rms (which are assumed to face full incentives) and
government-owned rms (which are assumed to face less than full incentives).5 We chose 1994 as
the starting time because most privatization has occurred since the mid-1990s. Although we tried
during the pretest period to elicit information as far back as 1990, we found that the recall of
ocials and managers, and secondary accounting and nancial data, deteriorated when trying to
answer questions on activities that had occurred more than ve years before. A detailed description
of the sample design is included in Appendix A.
The rm-level survey form included two main parts. Enumerators conducted a sit-down survey
with the rm manager. The manager survey elicited detailed information on rm ownership during
the survey period, the privatization process (including how rms were evaluated), and on the buyout
negotiation during which the initial price was established. We also asked the manager about other
3The township (town) is the lowest level of government in China's administrative hierarchy. Township govern-
ments established many enterprises in the 1980s, which are called Township Enterprises (TEs). This paper will use
TEs and (locally) government-owned enterprises interchangeably. Most of the literature put Township and Village
Enterprises together and call them TVEs, although TEs and VEs have some fundamental dierences. To have a
better understanding of China's TVEs, see Che and Qian (1998), Chen and Rozelle (1995), Putterman (1997) and
Walder (1995).
4Private rms in the sample are those rms that had never been government-owned. In other words, they were
originally established as private rms.
5Although we are assuming here that private rms face better incentives and they outperform government-owned
rms (thus establishing a standard for judging the performance of privatized rms), we actually test for this in the
empirical part.
4property rights, corporate governance, the rm's production and marketing activities, and his or
her human capital attributes. The rm's accountant also lled in a set of tables from the rm's
nancial and cost accounting records.
One of the most important goals of the survey was to collect good measures of the manager's
eort levels and the rm's performance. In order to do this, we took great eort to record detailed
information from the rm's income statements and balance sheets. We focus on three eort and
performance measures: the manager's weekly workload, accumulated inter-rm arrears to asset
ratio, and value added per worker. The manager's weekly workload is a straightforward measure
of performance and is dened in Table A3 in the Appendix.
To create a good measure of accounts receivable management, we start with the inter-rm
arrears rate, which is dened as a ratio of accumulated accounts receivable to total assets. We then
turn this variable into a \positive" measure of performance, called accounts receivable management,
a new variable that is dened as (1 - inter-rm arrears rate). We argue that the way a rm manages
its accounts receivable provides a measure of managerial behavior since unpaid accounts or arrears
tend to accumulate in rms whose managers have poor incentives to collect overdue accounts.6 For
example, in rms in which managers or salespeople sell products for a personal rebate (or kickback)
instead of increasing the rm's income, rm arrears could easily accumulate. Even worse, managers
sometimes diverge cash by providing trade credit to other rms that are owned by their relatives
or friends. At the very least, managers with poor incentives are not willing to put out the eort to
collect rm arrears.
We also use the rm's labor productivity to directly measure rm's performance. Specically,
we use value added per worker as a proxy of rm's labor productivity. As in Shirley and Xu (2001),
value added is dened as the dierence between sales and materials costs. We then dene value
added per worker as the value added to worker ratio. In estimating the production functions later,
we use the log of value added per worker as the dependent variable.
3 Privatization in Rural China: Primary Findings
According to the data, township enterprises have experienced a dramatic shift in ownership from
government to private and ocials sold most of the enterprises to the former managers. In 1993,
of the 135 government-owned rms in the sample, 88 had been privatized by the time of the survey
6Inter-rm arrears are used in Frydman and Rapaxzynski (1994), World Bank (1996), and Havrylyshyn and
Mcgettigan (1999) in studying privatization.
5in the summer of 1998 (Table 1).7 The ownership share of private individuals increased sharply
during the privatization movement, and management dominated the process. The government's
share of the 88 rms that privatized between 1994 and 1997 fell from 96 percent to only 12 percent.
Managers of the rms increased their personal shares the most, owning by far the largest part of
privately-held shares (nearly 70 percent).
Most rms (92 percent) also exercised insider privatization. In a typical case, the original
manager (or the manager that ran the rm preprivatization) bought out the rm completely or
partially. In only seven cases did outsiders buy the rm, but all of them were the only bidders for
the rms they bought. Even in these cases, however, the \outsiders" were local businesspersons
who knew the rms well.
One of the main problems with insider privatization is that the ocials are at an informational
disadvantage vis-a-vis managers during the negotiation process which establishes the buyout terms
for the rm. Ocials in China's rural areas typically do not know how ecient a rm will become
after ownership is transferred to its manager. The township governments usually own multiple
rms (the sample median is 12 rms per township). There is no way that ocials can know each
one well. Furthermore, each rm may sell its products to markets in many localities (the sample
median is 4 county market destinations per rm). Ocials have little idea where these markets are
located and who the rm's customers are. Ocials also do not have enough time to get to know
the rms because they are charged with many other duties. In contrast, the managers, who in most
cases have been running the rms for many years (the sample median is 5 years as the manager
and 12 years as an employee), better understand the rm's future prot-earning potentials and
have a more informed basis for knowing how much eort will be needed to overcome any serious
ineciencies. The main point here is that managers have a more accurate assessment of the true
value of rms than ocials when the privatization deals are negotiated.
Evaluations do not always help to reduce the information problem. Most evaluations (67 per-
cent) were carried out by the local government without an independent CPA. Even if there are
CPAs, their ability may be questionable. The evaluation team usually ends up primarily assessing
the value of the rm's assets and debts. Their most important job is to establish the book value of
the rm's assets. After enumerating the values of both the rm's assets and debts, the evaluation
team then sets the rm's equity value{the dierence between the values of its asset and debts. We
dene this as the rm's base value.
Another problem with insider privatization in China is that some privatization deals may involve
7Privatization means shifting all or part of a rm's share from the government to the manager or employees.
6corruption. Corrupted ocials may care more about the personal payments they receive than
the payment the government receives by selling these rms. Although we do not have a good
measure for the degree of corruption and the size of bribes, our talks with local ocials, rm
managers and bank managers indicate that some under-priced deals indeed involve under-the-table
payments. Systematic information on this topic, however, is dicult to obtain since rms being
caught engaging in corruption can be severely punished. We know of cases both before and after
privatization where the books of rms were reviewed during a corruption investigation.
3.1 Performance and the Buyout Price
The buyout prices that managers pay on rms vary sharply across the sample. In Table 2, we
divide the privatized rms into groups, ranking them by the ratio of the buyout price to the base
value, a normalized measure of the buyout price. We will call this ratio the BPBV ratio. At one
extreme, twenty-one rms (row 1) have a BPBV ratio close to zero (9 of them are zero). Managers
of these rms did not have to pay much, or in some cases did not have to pay anything to buy
the rm. At the other extreme, seven rms have a negative BPBV ratio (row 6). In these cases,
the rms were sold for a non-negative price, although they had a negative base value (or the rm's
debts exceeded its assets). There also are 20 rms which have a BPBV ratio exceeding one. The
rest of the rms had a BPBV ratio between zero and one.
The last column of Table 2 shows the average of the premium rate, another measure of nor-
malized buyout price, associated with each BPBV category. We dene premium and premium rate
respectively by using the formula: premium = buyout price - base value, and premium rate =
premium/book value of asset. The premium rate is a better measure than the BPBV ratio for a
number of reasons. First, seven rms have a negative equity value and, as a result, a negative BPBV
ratio. The negative ratios are dicult to compare to the positive ones, since, in fact, managers paid
a positive premium for these rms. Second, there are also some rms with small equity positions,
that have BPBV ratios that are very large. Hence, the BPBV ratio has a skewed distribution,
with the 90th percentile almost 5,000 times as big as the 10th percentile. The buyout price is not
subject to this problem since its distribution is smooth. In the following, we will call the premium
rate the normalized buyout price or just buyout price for simplication.
Examination of the data reveals a correlation between performance and the buyout price of the
rm: managers who pay \higher" premiums tend to perform better than those who pay \lower"
premiums postprivatization. Table 3 divides the sample into three groups of rms: \heavily-
discounted" rms or those with buyout prices less than -.2 (30 rms), \moderately-discounted"
7rms or those with buyout prices between -0.2 and 0 (26 rms), and \premium-paying" rms
or those with buyout prices greater than or equal to 0 (32 rms). Grouped this way, it is clear
that the performance of premium-paying rms postprivatization improved more than that of the
discounted rms. Heavily-discounted rms, in contrast, performed the poorest when comparing
preprivatization performance to postprivatization performance.
During our interviews, we also distinctly noticed that rms with dierent buyout prices also
diered in the amount of eort their managers exerted. Some managers exerted almost no eort
to improve the eciency of their newly acquired rms. These, almost always, were the ones
that said they bought their rms at a relatively low buyout price. But according to conventional
economic thinking, it would not have been the discount that caused the under-performance. Under
\ordinary" circumstance, the buyout price should have been considered as a sunk cost. Rather,
the poorer eort may have been the consequence of getting the rm for such a discount, and other
terms accompanying the discount may have aected their incentives to exert eort in the rm. The
attitude of owners of heavily-discounted rms toward the rms often had not changed much from
the time when they were hired as managers for the government-owned rms.
Our data also contain evidence of the dierential eorts. Managers, who paid a positive premium
appear to have exerted more eort and showed more interest in improving their newly acquired
rms (Table 3). For example, managers of the premium-paying rms work 13 hours longer per
week than managers of the heavily-discounted rms (column 1).
3.2 OLS: The Baseline Specications
To further test the relationship between performance and the buyout price, we employ the OLS
model, which we call the \baseline" specication. The OLS model to estimate performance (or
eort) is specied as
 = 0 + V 1 + X2 + Z3 + 1; (1)
where s are a set of coecients, 1 is the residual, and the variables are dened as follows. We use
two alternative measures of the dependent variable, , in two separate equations: the manager's
workload and accounts receivable management. The variable, V , represents the buyout price, and
X includes a set of variables representing the rm's size, asset level, and two attributes of the
manager, his education and managerial experience. We include X to control for factors that can be
observed about the quality of the rm. Following Groves et al. (1994) and Frydman et al. (1999),
we also include Z, which represents a set of provincial and industrial sector indicators to control
for local policies and market conditions. Some regressions do not include Z and are called \partial
8specication," while others that include Z are called \full specication." All variables and their
explanations are listed in Table A3 in the Appendix.
Following Jensen and Meckling (1979), McMillan et al. (1989), Groves et al. (1995) and
Shirley and Xu (2001), we also estimate an value added worker ratio. In estimating the production
functions, we take the logs of dependent and some independent variables. The OLS model to be
estimated is:
logy = 0 + V 1 + (logL)2 + (logk)3 + Z4 + 2; (2)
where logy is the log of value added per capita, logL is the log of employment and logk is the log
of capital labor ratio.
To measure the impact of the buyout price on the performance of privatized rm (postpriva-
tization), we use a sub-sample to estimate equations (1) and (2). In this sub-sample, we use all
postprivatization years for the privatized rms. For each rm in this sample, we can have at most
four observations (1994 to 1997), if the rm was privatized in 1994. All rms have at least one
observation (that is at least the observation for 1997, if it was privatized in the last year of our
sample).8
The OLS estimate using the full specication performs fairly well (Table 4). The R-squared
ranges between 0.23 and 0.59, and other goodness of t statistics are rather high. The F-statistics
are also signicant, at least at the 10 percent level. Many coecients on the variables representing
rm size (assets and employment) and the manager's human capital are not signicant.
The baseline specication lends some further support to the hypothesis that the buyout price
is positively correlated with rm performance (Table 4, row 1) The signs on the coecients of
the normalized buyout price variable are all positive and signicant. When managers pay a high
premium for their rms, they appear to work more hours per week, reduce the proportion of the
assets accounted for by accounts receivable and increase labor productivity.
4 Theories
While the primary results show that there is a correlation between rm's postprivatization perfor-
mance and the buyout price in Table 4, they do not prove causation. For example, it could be that
both the buyout price and performance are determined by unobserved rm quality. Suppose that
both government ocial and manager know the true value of the rm ex ante and the buyout price
8Unfortunately, we can only use this sampling strategy for two performance measures{accounts receivable man-
agement and value added per worker. We have to use a smaller sample for the manager's workload since we only
collected data on workload for 1997.
9re
ects nothing but the postprivatization quality of the rm. In this case, rms with higher buyout
prices perform better ex post simply because they are better. In other words, the coecient on the
buyout price variable is biased.
In the rest of this section, we are going to provide two more theoretical explanations for the
positive correlation between rm's performance and the buyout price. Although the two theories
dier, in general, they both predict the same causation: An increase of buyout price will cause
an increase of rm performance. Specically, the two theories show that the buyout price and
postprivatization incentives uniquely determine and increase with each other. This one-to-one
relationship indicates that rm's postprivatization performance increases with the size of buyout
price. In the following section, we will subject the theories to a series of empirical tests.
4.1 Screening Theory
In this subsection, we explain how a screening mechanism, rst modeled by Laont and Tirole
(1986), can be used by ocials to elicit information from managers and how the model generates
predictions consistent with the observation in the eld, our descriptive ndings, and the preliminary
results. We rst describe the theory. We then generate predictions from the model. Finally, we
show how economic environment and especially the degree of information asymmetries aect the
size of buyout price. The formal model and its proofs are provided in the appendix.
There are two risk neutral players in the model: an ocial who represents the government, the
seller of the rm, and a manager, the buyer.9 Since we have only one rm, the normalized buyout
price and buyout price are the same thing. Both the ocial and the manager care only about their
own benets.10 The ocial has a rm to sell and the only buyer is the rm's manager.
After taking possession of the rm, the manager will run a \one-shot" project and then shut
down the rm. The prot of this project is  = e + , where e, the deterministic part, denotes
the manager's eort level, and , the stochastic part with mean zero, is determined by some set of
exogenous factors. Implicitly, the price of the manager's eort is 1. There is a personal cost to the
manager for his eort, C(e;). The parameter, , can either be the manager's ability to manage a
rm or the quality of the rm that is only known by the manager.
Both the manager's type () and eort (e) are the manager's private information. Thus, the
ocial does not know ex ante the expected prots of the rm under the manager's ownership. The
9Risk neutrality is not crucial in this paper. We could have a risk averse manager or even a risk averse ocial.
But since the focus of the paper is not risk sharing, risk neutrality can simplify the analysis.
10Township ocials have strong incentives to maximize revenues, because they need to use these revenues to pay
their own wages and to cover most of the expenditures of the governments, which if done successfully could lead to
promotion. See Qian and Weingast (1997) and Chen and Rozelle (1999) on this.
10ocial only knows the distribution of , and observes the rm's prots when the production process
has nished. The manager's type  has a p.d.f. f and a c.d.f. F on (;).11
The screening contract has two parts: a buyout price for the rm, V , and a future payment
contingent on the privatized rm's protability, , which species that  share of the prots
are kept by the manager and 1    share goes to the ocial. The ocial oers the manager a
menu of contracts, each one consisting of some combination of the two key terms. For managers
who pay a lower premium, the government will have the right to take a larger part of the rm's
postprivatization prots. Such a contract is said to \leave a tail" in the hands of government
ocials. For managers who are willing to pay more for the rm ex ante, the government will take
a smaller (or no) part of the rm's postprivatization prots. In equilibrium, good managers will
be separated from bad managers.12 Good managers, who believe that they can make substantial
prots if they put all of their eorts into the rm, would prefer to pay a greater buyout price ex
ante and keep most or all the prots in the future. Bad managers, in contrast, knowing that they
will not likely achieve much postprivatization, will pay only a small amount up front and share a
greater part of the prots with the government.
As discussed in Laont and Tirole (1986), there is a tradeo between inducing revelation ex
ante and inducing eort ex post for this kind of mechanism. Although this mechanism makes it
possible to elicit important information ex ante for the government, there is a cost. The contract
terms accepted by some managers will not provide strong ex post incentives. In this subset of
cases, the manager's ownership rights are incomplete, and their postprivatizaiton performance will
be reduced. They face a moral hazard problem because the manager's eort at improving the rm
eciency is not completely observable or contractible. However, it could be that this cost, under
some circumstances, is worth it if the benet of the better screening mechanism allows local ocials
to elicit useful information and to execute complete privatization (or privatization without a tail)
with the best managers and best rms. As is common in this setup, in equilibrium the ocial will
give full incentives to the best managers but not to the others.
The implications of the screening theory are summarized as follows. When a manager pays a
buyout price for his rm, in fact, it is not a sunk cost; the size of the buyout price actually ends up
positively aecting eort and performance. The marginal impact arises because the contract for
a good manager, compared with that for a bad manager, not only involves a higher buyout price,
11F is such that the hazard rate h() = f()=(1   F()) is weakly increasing. This assumption is needed to show
that there exists a unique equilibrium.
12In our paper, managers are \good" if they either have an inherent ability to manage rms and make them perform
better or if they are the managers of rms that ex ante have a high potential to earn future prots (but this potential
is unobserved by outsiders).
11but the higher buyout price is accompanied by a more favorable sharing rule. In other words, the
sharing rule  and the buyout price V are uniquely determined by and increase monotonically with
each other.
These results essentially provide the basis for empirically testing the hypothesis that the buyout
price positively aects performance. Since we know that performance  and eort e increase with
, and  increases with V ,  and e increase with the size of the buyout price, V . This result allows
us to use V as a proxy for incentives  in the empirical models.
The screening theory also implies that the best managers and only the best managers () are
given the socially optimal incentives ( = 1) and exert socially optimal eort (e). Although the
main goal of privatization is to give managers better incentives so that they can improve the rm's
performance, giving all managers full incentives might not be feasible given the severe information
asymmetries. In order to elicit information from the manager, the ocial has to sacrice some
eciency. As a result, only the best managers are given full incentives, and the other managers are
given less than socially optimal incentives. The ultimate implication of this means that we should
see a wide range of performance of insider privatized rms, as well as giving us another testable
hypothesis: Privatized rms with good incentives, or those that pay the highest buyout prices, will
perform as if they were private rms; those with poor incentives, or those that pay lower prices,
do not perform as well as private rms. Firms paying lower prices were being tested to see if they
actually perform like government-owned rms, which will be shown to perform signicantly worse
than private rms.
One important assumption for the screening mechanism to work is that the government ocials
must be able to commit to a contract, either explicitly or implicitly. Reputation frequently is a
mechanism that prevents the government ocials from breaching their contracts. The ocials
in rural China, in order to develop their local economy and collect more taxes or fees from these
enterprises, have a strong incentive to create a reputation for fair dealing (Walder, 1995). Breaching
a contract could be costly to ocials, since local businesses could move away if they believed the
government ocials were unfair to the rms. The ocials also care about their reputations if they
had additional rms to sell or other direct enterprises to run in the future (for example, renting
out township-owned land or selling real estate).
Some Extensions of the Screening Theory
Our screening theory has several simplifying assumptions: (1) all ocials face the same degree
of information asymmetries, (2) managers are risk neutral, and (3) managers do not have wealth
12constraints when they buy a rm. Although there are reasons to believe these assumptions do not
hold in reality, relaxing them does not change our basic theoretical ndings. In fact, the variation
of degree of information asymmetries, risk level and wealth constraints provide ways to examine
the contract selection.
The equilibrium buyout price and the prot sharing rule may depend on the degree of infor-
mation asymmetry. Ocials with better information should be able to rene contracts to better
t the manager's types. The ocial with better information before privatization can request the
manager pay more up front and provide him with better rights postprivatization (that is a higher
). As a result, the rm performs better postprivatization.
One easy way to demonstrate this is as follows.13 Suppose that the ocial's information about
the manager's type becomes more precise in such a way that she knows that  is no worse than
0, or  is distributed between [0;], where   0  . In this case, the more precise information
structure will not change the sharing rule  but will increase the buyout price V . The better-
informed ocial (that knows the manager is not lower than a certain quality 0) can raise the
buyout price since she can eliminate certain sets of contracts, the ones with low buyout prices (V )
and low sharing rules () for types lower than 0. When these contracts are not available, the
ocial does not need to worry that the remaining managers will pretend to be a poor manager
(there are none) and select to choose that contract that allows him to pay a low buyout price. The
ocial can then raise the buyout prices for all of the remaining contract choices, while leaving the
sharing rule constant. When the upper bound of the distribution is reduced and the lower bound
raised, both () and the V () could increase. At the extreme, when the upper bound fades enough
and the lower bound rises enough so that  =  = , then information becomes symmetric. The
rst best outcome,  = 1 and V = the rm's true value, can be achieved.
We also have neglected risk aversion and wealth constraints in our framework. Clearly, both
risk aversion and wealth constraints of the manager may have a role in justifying a smaller share
of future prots and a smaller buyout price.14 When a high quality manager is credit constrained,
the problem is that although his optimal contract is one with a large buyout price and a sharing
rule near 1, he is unable to produce enough cash to pay the buyout price. In this case, the ocial
needs to redesign the contract, dropping both the buyout price and the sharing rule, which means
that the ocial will be worse o than if there was not a wealth constraint. The lower welfare
position of the ocial is not surprising since the new problem that she is solving is one with an
13See Laont and Tirole (1993) for a more detailed arguement
14See Laont and Matousssi (1995) for a more detailed argument.
13additional constraint which means the ocial's welfare can not be higher. Making the manager
risk averse will aect the outcome of the problem similarly. Following Laont and Matoussi (1995),
in certain versions of our empirical analysis we hold wealth and risk constant to illustrate that our
ndings regarding the eect of information asymmetries on contract form does not change even
after accounting for credit constraints and risk considerations.
Direct Evidence of the Screening Contract
Although our original survey instrument was not able to isolate the contractual contingencies,
new information supports the idea that a tail does exist with privatization in rural China. In a
supplementary survey that we conducted in the summer of 2000, we asked the following question
to government ocials: Are there rms which you privatized for which you received only a small
buyout price, but from which you expect to receive future payments? Ocials in 15 out of 38
townships answered \yes" to this question. Many respondents actually told us that this question
is sensitive because the central government has been cracking down fee collecting activities by the
local governments.15 We consider this to be prima facie evidence that such contractual forms do
exist. But discussions with the new survey enumerators raise caution about using this information
for any thing more than establishing a lower bound. Another set of survey questions on fees and
prots turned into the government by the rm show that rms indeed make further payments post-
privatization, and the payments are negatively correlated with the buyout price. The correlation
between the postprivatization payment (as a percentage of prot) and the normalized buyout price
is -0.39. 16
4.2 Corruption Theory
A corruption theory could also explain our primary empirical ndings. If the ocial were to ask
the rm for a payment to her personal account, the manager might be allowed to purchase the rm
for a below-market, discounted price. If there were no chance of being caught, the manager would
have full incentives for the rm's future prots. However, if there was a chance of that the manager
gets caught and be punished for corruption, and if the probability of getting caught was greater
the more discount the manager received, the manager in this case would obviously face imperfect
incentives.
In terms of our theoretical framework, we can also demonstrate the impact of corruption on
performance. Suppose the rm's value is E, and the manager can pay any price, V , between 0
15Although the central government action is mainly about fees imposed on farmers, the local ocials were conser-
vative even when being interviewed by our enumerators.
16This provides only some anecdotal evidence since we have only 25 responses on this question.
14and E for the rm. The ocial also demands that the manager pay her a bribe (E   V ). If
0 <  < 1, then the manager underpays (or gets a dsicount) when he buys the rm. Suppose that
the probability that corruption is not detected is P, and P is a function of V   E, the observed
discount the manager receives. We assume that P increases with V   E, or P 0(V   E) > 0. In
other words, the probability of being detected is higher for a higher discount (bribe). This would
be the case if the degree of underpayment could trigger an audit or if it becomes more likely
someone would notice the ocial's increase in wealth when he takes a higher bribe. It is also not
unreasonable to assume that if the manager is caught, he will lose the rm. If he is not caught,
the value of the rm will be  = e + .17 The manager maximizes the following expected utility
after privatization: P(V   E)e   C(e), where C(e) is the cost of the manager's eort, subject to
the manager's Individual Rationality constraint, P(V  E)e  C(e) > E +(1  )V . Suppose for
simplicity that the buyout price, V , and the size of the corruption (E  V ) are determined by the
government ocial. If we assume C is convex, then it can be shown that the manager's eort level,
e, and also the rm's performance, , increases with V .18
One of the most signicant results for our empirical work is that the corruption theory generates
the same prediction as the screening theory: Manager's postprivatization eort and the rm's
performance increase with the size of the buyout price. Hence, if we see in the performance
equation that the coecient on the buyout price variable is positive, we do not know if this is due
to the nature of the screening contract or the result of corruption. The main dierence here is
that the corruption theory does not require information to be asymmetric. In other words, even
when the ocial knows a rm's true value, the rm could still be under-priced because the ocial
may provide a discount to the manager in exchange for a bribe. Hence, if asymmetric information
signicantly impacts the buyout price, we can have evidence that screening matters. In the next
section, we will test statistically whether asymmetric information is playing an important role in
the size of the buyout price. If it is, we can assume at least part of the eect of the buyout price on
performance is from screening. We cannot rule out, however, that another part is from corruption.
5 Further Empirical Tests and Results
We have three objectives in this section. First, we want to identify the causation that is predicted
by screening and corruption theories which lead to the result that the buyout price improves eort
17There could be more serious punishment for bribing such as being jailed, but we consider only economic punish-
ment specic to the rm for the analysis.
18We can allow V to be endogenously determined. Under certain assumptions, V should have an interior solution




dV > 0 should still hold.
15and performance. Second, we want to show that information and screening play an important role
in the privatization process. Last, we want to measure the magnitude of the eect of the buyout
price on performance.
To accomplish these tasks, our strategy of estimation can be described in four steps. The
rst two focus on identifying the causation between rm performance and the size of the buyout
price. The third step focuses on testing the role of information asymmetries on the size of the
buyout price. The fourth step compares the performance of privatized rms to that of private and
government-owned rms.
5.1 Firm Fixed-Eect Model
As discussed above, one potential problem with the primary OLS results is that they might be
subject to an endogeneity problem. The OLS model implicitly assumes that the buyout price is
exogenous and uncorrelated with the error term specied in equations (1) and (2). The buyout
price, however, might be endogenous due to the omission of important variables that characterize
the quality of the rm and the abilities of the manager. Although we do control some of the
manager's attributes, for example, education and managerial experience, other variables, such as
the manager's entrepreneurship, are not observed.19 If an unobservable, in particular the quality
of the rm, is correlated with the buyout price, the coecient estimated by OLS would be biased.
In such a case, part or all of the magnitude of the coecients on the buyout price variable would
be measuring the impact of the quality of the rm on the buyout price.
To account for the omitted variable bias, we employ a rm xed-eect model. The rm xed-
eect model requires that we use a panel data of the privatized rms from 1994 to 1997. To
implement this estimation strategy, we include a rm indicator variable for each rm, which measure
the unobserved rm and manager characteristics, and take the rst dierence between years. We run
OLS regressions using these dierences. Assuming the unobserved rm and manager characteristics
are time-invariant (a xed rm specic dummy variable across years), the rm xed-eect model
will essentially eliminate these characteristics from the estimation, and eliminates any bias.
The independent variables in the rm xed-eect models are, however, somewhat dierent from
those in previous models. Since we include all observations on each individual rm, we have an
indicator variable (postprivatization indicator) to capture the eect of privatization. This is needed
since the privatization eect must rst be removed in order to isolate the buyout price eect. Since
19These unobservable variables are of two types: one type is unobserved by both the ocials and the econometrician.
The other type is only unobserved by the econometrician. Both types could be correlated with the buyout price.
16the buyout prices only apply to those years postprivatization, they equal zero otherwise. Also, we
drop all variables that do not vary across years. The control variables in z capture the interactive
eect of year with province and sectors. Specically, we use the interactive terms of the year
indicators with the province and sector indicators, to control for local policies and industry and
market conditions in dierent years.
The xed-eect model results support the hypothesis that the increase of the buyout price leads
to improved rm performance even when controlling for the quality of the rm (Table 5, row 3).
The sign on the coecient of the normalized buyout price overall are positive and signicant in
both equations. The magnitude of the eect is also large. An increase in the normalized buyout
price by one standard deviation (0.21) will decrease rm arrears rate by 4 percentage points (the
mean is 19 percent) and increase value added per worker by 11,309 yuan (the mean is 11,635 yuan).
5.2 2SLS
The buyout price, however, might be endogenous for another reason. It could be that the size of
the buyout price is paid by the manager who is anticipating how well he will perform (or how much
eort he will expend) after choosing the buyout price and accompanied incentives. If such thinking
greatly in
uences the way contracts are designed, then conceptually the performance of the rm
might be said to be aecting the size of the buyout price.
In order to test for and control both the simultaneity and the omitted variable bias, we employ a
2SLS approach. In the rst stage, we estimate a reduced form buyout price function which includes
two instrument variables (IVs). In the second stage, we use the tted value of the buyout price
from the rst stage of the analysis to examine the eect of the buyout price on rm performance.
The key to using a 2SLS model is to nd appropriate IVs to identify the buyout price. Good IVs
should be able to explain the buyout price, but not have any independent explanatory power on the
rm's performance except through its eect on the buyout price. To this end, we use measures of
the degree of information asymmetry as IVs. We argue that these measures satisfy both conditions.
First, as seen in the theory part of the paper, the buyout price increases with the improvement of
the ocial's information about the rm. At the extreme, when information is symmetric between
the ocial and the manager, the buyout price will be the same as the rm's true value. Second,
the extent of knowledge the ocials have about the rm's potential earning capability should have
no direct in
uence on rm performance.
The two measures we use to measure information asymmetry in the analysis are the number of
government-owned rms in the township in 1993 and the number of markets in which each rm sells
17its products.20 We use the number of rms and the number of market destinations as instruments
because in townships where there are a large number of rms or where rms, preprivatization,
operate in a large number of markets, township ocials have relatively less information about any
given rm. Ceteris paribus, ocials that have less information about the rm will receive relatively
less buyout price for that rm (and vice versa), since the manager can more eectively use his
inside knowledge of the rm to bargain for a good price. The buyout price should decrease with
both the number of government-owned rms and the number of market destinations.
Using the two IVs, we can estimate the following two equation model, 21
Buyout price : V = 
0 + IV 
1 + X
2 +  (3)
Performance :  = 0 + ^ V 1 + X2 + 1: (4)
When estimating equation (3), we use both a full and a partial specication, dened in the same
way as those in the OLS models. Because the partial model ts better, it is used for generating
the tted buyout price, ^ V , that is used in estimating equation (4).
The results of the rst stage regression show that the two IVs perform well and have an inter-
esting interpretation (Table 6). Both the number of rms and the number of market destinations
have negative and signicant eects on the buyout price. The negative signs of these coecients
conrm the prediction that asymmetric information leads to a lower buyout price. Moreover, the
ndings are just the opposite of what would be expected if the indicators primarily re
ect the
value of the rm (since rms in successful townships and with big markets might be expected to
be positive rm characteristics that would yield a higher buyout price). Even more importantly,
the number of rms and the number of market destinations are statistically valid instruments. A
Hausman exclusion restriction test shows that the two IVs have joint explanatory power on the
buyout price (with a p-value of 0.008 as reported in Table 6) and that they have no independent
eect on performance (with a p-value at least as large as 0.55).22
The results of the second stage of the 2SLS model provide further conrmation that the buyout
price has a positive eect on performance (Table 5, row 4). All coecients of the variable buyout
price are positive and signicant. Although standard errors are larger compared to those of the
20Kung and Lin (2000) use the number rms to measure the ability of the village ocials to monitor their enterprises.
21The counterpart for the production function is logy = 0 + ^ V 1 + (logL)2 + (logk)3 + Z4 + 2.
22To test if the set of identifying instruments are exogenous, a Lagrange multiplier test can be used (Hausman,
1983). The chi-square distributed test statistics with 2 degrees of freedom, is N  R
2, where N is the number of
observations, and R
2 is the measure of goodness of t of the regression of the residuals from the performance equations
on the variables, which are exogenous to the system. The test statistics ranges between 0 and 1.22 which indicate
that the null hypothesis that there is no correlation between the exogenous instruments and the disturbance term
from performance equation can not be rejected.
18OLS estimations, the coecients on the buyout price are also larger.
5.3 Determinants of Buyout Price
To further investigate the determinants of the buyout price, we estimate equation (3) again, but
with two more variables to capture the eects of wealth constraints and risk aversion. We do this
because in addition to wanting to increase our understanding of the factors that aect the buyout
price, we also want to ensure that at least of the determinants of the buyout price is asymmetric
information, and we are not merely picking up a spurious correlation. Our wealth constraint variable
is created from information derived directly from managers during our survey. If the manager said
he was wealth-constrained, the wealth constraint variable is set equal to 1; if the manager did
not believe he was wealth constrained, the variable is set equal to 0. Twenty-four percent of the
managers reported facing wealth constraints. The variable risk level is measured as the standard
deviation of a rm's sales growth. We expect that both variables have a negative sign in the
regressions. Wealth-constrained managers can not aord the \optimal" buyout price; risk-averse
managers facing higher risk levels will only purchase the rm for a lower price.
The regression results, even when wealth constraints and risk considerations are added, still
support our theory that ex ante information asymmetries and screening play an important role on
the size of the buyout price. Both wealth constraints and risk level have negative eects on the
buyout price as expected (Table 7). Managers facing wealth constraints have a normalized buyout
price more than half a standard deviation lower (columns 2, 3 and 5). The risk level also has a
negative but modest eect. An increase of the risk level of one standard deviation (3.4) reduces the
normalized buyout price by about one-sixth of one standard deviation. After controlling for the
eects of wealth constraints and risk level, however, a manager still pays a relatively larger buyout
price the more the ocial knows about her rm. Our measure of information asymmetries, both
the number of rms and the number of market destinations, have a signicant eect on the buyout
price (columns 3 to 5) . The coecients on both variables are also stable and jointly signicant.
Adding the two measures of information asymmetries improves the goodness of t (column 2 versus
5).
If these eects are typical for rms in rural China, they show, in general, how privatization of
small rms leads to improved rm performance. They also show that not all rms improve their
performance equally. Firms with a higher buyout price improve performance more than those with
a lower buyout price.
195.4 Eciency Eect
To examine the magnitude of the eect of the buyout price, we compare the performance of priva-
tized rms with that of private and government-owned rms. In order to do this, we employ a group
xed-eect model and use the whole panel data set, including private rms and government-owned
rms. \Group" in this case re
ects the way in which we divide our rms. We split the sample
into eight groups according to their ownership and buyout price{one group for government-owned
rms, one for private rms, and six for privatized rms.
In order to pinpoint the eect of privatization, we divide privatized rms into three groups:
premium-paying rms, moderately-discounted rms and heavily-discounted rms. To compare
performance before and after privatization and to control for omitted variable bias, we further
divide each buyout price group into two sub-groups by the time of privatization: preprivatization
and postprivatization. Thus, in total we have six indicator variables for privatized rms. For
example, the premium-paying preprivatization indicator equals one if the rm is a premium-paying
rm but it has not been privatized in that year. The rest of these indicator variables are dened
in Table A3.
The analysis demonstrates that private rms indeed perform better than government-owned
rms (Table 8). Compared with government-owned rms, private rms have 3.8 percentage points
lower arrears rate (the mean of all rms is 19 percent), a 12,032 yuan higher value added per
worker, and their managers work 9.4 hours longer per week. Row 1 shows that ownership does
make a dierence in performance.
Our results also demonstrate that rm postprivatization performance increases with the buyout
price (rows 5 to 7). For the premium-paying rms, manager's workload is 11.9 hours higher than
for government-owned rms. Value added per worker is 12,214 yuan higher. Better management in
premium-paying rms has decreased the rm arrears rate by 5.5 percentage points when compared
with the government-owned rms. The signicance level and magnitude of the coecient of the
buyout price variable decrease as the size of the buyout price falls.
Our approach also allows us to test whether the premium-paying rms are catching up with
private rms in terms of performance and whether the heavily-discounted rms perform dierently
from government-owned ones. In order to test these hypotheses, we conduct a series of F-tests,
testing the equivalence of the performance of the various types of rms. In particular, we rst test
for the equivalence of premium-paying rms and private rms postprivatization. More simply, we
are testing if the coecients in row 1 are the same as those in row 5. If we fail to reject the rst
20test, we can say that the premium-paying rms caught up with private rms after privatization. A
similar test for heavily-discounted rms tests whether they were in any way distinguishable from
government-owned rms.
The ndings of the hypothesis tests demonstrate the role that the buyout price plays in im-
proving managerial incentive in privatized rms (Table 9). Manager's workload, accounts receivable
management and value added per worker of premium-paying privatized rms are indistinguishable
from those of private rms (row 1). In contrast, heavily discounted rms perform the same as the
more poorly performing government-owned rms (row 2). Another test also shows that premium-
paying rms perform signicantly better than heavily discounted rms (row 3).
6 Conclusion
In our eorts to explain the heterogeneous performance of insider privatized rms across China's
townships during the late 1990s, we have provided two theoretical explanations of the observed
facts: screening and corruption. Our screening theory suggests that in the face of information
asymmetry between the seller and buyer of a rm, the buyout price and a contractually contingent
payment in the form of a claim on future rm prots by the government ocial can be used to
elicit private information from the buyer about the rm's future protability. Using such a contract,
ocials can maximize their revenues and keep privatization from becoming stalled. Although some
ineciency arises due to the poorer incentives that some managers face, \privatization with a tail"
allows ocials to separate good managers from poor managers (or strong rms from weak rms)
and attain a second-best solution.
Our corruption theory, which produces similar predictions to the screening theory, concludes
that rms are under-priced because ocials receive bribes from managers. Afraid of being audited,
the likelihood of which would increase with the size of the discount the manager received for the
rm, managers are uncertain about the security of the ownership they have acquired by bribing,
and act as if they do not have full incentives.
In the empirical part of the paper, by drawing on a unique data set that we collected in 1998, we
demonstrated that the buyout price in
uences rms' performance postprivatization and information
asymmetries aect the buyout price. We are also able to show that managers of premium-paying
rms perform as well as private rms, while those that pay a heavily-discounted buyout price do
not perform any better than the sample's relatively inecient government-owned rms.
Although our study centers on the case of a subset of rms from Jiangsu and Zhejiang Provinces,
21it may help in explaining a number of empirical regularities, both for China as a whole and for
transition economies beyond China. For example, the study's ndings are consistent with the
mixed results that frequently appear in studies of the eects of insider privatization (Earle, 1998;
Havrylyshyn and McGettigan, 1999; Nellis, 1999). Although there are other explanations why
insider privatization may not succeed, the results of our empirical models suggests that perhaps
if other studies grouped privatized rms that were sold to their managers on the basis of the size
of the buyout price, they might have found that some privatized rms consistently outperformed
those of others.
The results of our study, however, still leave a number of questions unanswered. It is still
unclear why it is that China's rural ocials have depended so heavily on insider privatization
and \privatization with a tail" while ocials in other countries have not. The fact that China's
rural rms are smaller and that formal and informal credit markets in China are more developed,
may facilitate sales to individuals or sets of individuals where such transactions are not possible
elsewhere. It could also be that outsiders in China possess so little information about these rural
rms that buying them could be extremely risky investments. Likewise, insiders in China may
already have an overwhelming advantages. Because reforms to China's management system in the
rural sector have been unfolding since the mid-1980s, many income and control rights had already
been shifted to managers by xed lease contracts. Privatization in this case is merely the shift of
ownership of the rm's assets. Or there might be a winner's curse{if outsiders win an auction they
must have overpaid because of the lack of information. It could even be that it is easy for the
corrupted ocials to strike a bribe deal with the insider.
But, privatization, in general, and insider privatization, in particular, are 
ourishing in rural
China. And it is happening on its own. In many cases, privatized rms are succeeding. In this
aspect, our study is among the rst to really provide an systematic explanation{both theoretical and
empirical{of what appears to be the largest episode of privatization in any country since transition
began, and perhaps in history.
22Appendix
A Survey Design
Our survey involved eldwork that spanned more than two years and geographically covered all of
our two study provinces. Following three pilot surveys in 1997 and early 1998, the main survey
was conducted in the summer of 1998. Thirteen enumerators spent three months in the study area.
Although the two provinces are known as one of the heartlands of the rural industrial movement,
each province has its own special features and contains great heterogeneity.
The sampling procedure was designed to ensure that we randomly chose a diverse and broad-
based set of sample regions. We drew eight counties from Jiangsu Province and seven counties
from Zhejiang Provinces after stratifying all of the counties in each province into three income
groups. The fteen counties are located in ve regions of the two provinces: Northern Jiangsu,
Central Jiangsu, Southern Jiangsu, Northern Zhejiang and Southern Zhejiang. Within each county
we chose four townships also by stratifying on the basis of income. In total, we conducted surveys
in fty-nine townships.
Firm selection also followed several pre-dened rules to ensure that we had a sample of rms that
would facilitate our analysis. Upon arriving in each township, the business administration bureau
provided us with a comprehensive list of all rms that operated in the township in 1994. Using size
and ownership data that also came from the same bureau, we narrowed the sample, following six
rules: a.) the sampled enterprise should have no foreign shares; b.) the sampled enterprise should
be an independent tax paying unit with no subsidiaries; c.) the sampled enterprise should have
at least twenty employees and a xed capital base that exceeded 200,000 yuan.23 d.) the sampled
enterprise should be a manufacturing rm, and rms classied as providing services were excluded;
e.) the sampled rm should be located within the geographic center of the township's ocial area,
and would be excluded if it were located far away from the center.24 f.) the sampled enterprise was
not in bankruptcy in the summer of 1998. The enumeration group randomly selected three rms
from the revised list. In total, we completed surveys on 168 rural enterprises. Tables A1 and A2
present industry distributions and the means of rm size for each ownership group.
23One US Dollar = 8.3 Chinese yuan.
24The sampling is so designed because almost all TEs and big private rms are located at the center of the township,
and distance is the major cost when conducting the survey.
23B The Screening Model
The ocial's expected prot, (), from each contract (();V ()) with a manager of type , is the
sum of the down payment V () and the expected value of her share of the future prots W(();),
V () + W(();); (5)
where W(();) = (1   ())e(). The manager's expected utility function ex ante is given by
 V () + U(();); (6)
where U(();) = ()e()   C(e();) is the manager's ex post utility.
We assume that the manager's cost of eort, C(e;), has the following properties: (i) C(0;) =
0, Ce(0;) = 0 and Ce(0;) = 0; (ii) for e > 0, Ce = @C=@e > 0, Cee = @2C=@e2 > 0, C =
@C=@ < 0 and Ce = @2C=(@e@) < 0; (iii) Ceee = @3C=@e3  0, Cee = @3C=(@e2@)  0, and




2CeeCe > 0. Here, assumption (i) denes the initial conditions; assumption (ii) is the convexity
and the single crossing condition; assumptions (iii) and (iv), together with later assumptions,
guarantee the existence of a unique equilibrium.25
Note that after making the down payment, the manager only cares about the ex post utility,
U(();). The social surplus (S), the sum of the ocial's prot (equation 5) and the manager's
utility (equation 6), is
S = W(();) + U(();) (7)
= e   C(e();): (8)
Notice that equation 8 shows that the social surplus is exactly the rm's expected value, e, minus
the cost of the manager's eort C. The rst order condition for maximizing the social surplus,
given the manager's type, , is
1   Ce(e;) = 0; (9)
where the marginal cost of the manager's eort, Ce, equals the marginal benet, 1. The solution
to equation 9, e, is the socially optimal level of eort.
Given the objectives and choices of the ocial and manager in this subsection, in the following
subsections, we characterize the economic behavior of the two parties under dierent assumptions.
We rst solve for the optimal contract and ex post manager's eort in the case of symmetric
25A quardratic cost function, C =
e2
 satises assumptions (i)-(iv).
24information. Then, we demonstrate the existence of a unique optimal linear scheme of the screening
model when the manager's information is private. Finally, we conduct comparative statics in the
case of asymmetric information in order to be able to formally relate performance () to the down
payment (V ).
B.1 Manager's Type Known
In this subsection, we consider the case of symmetric information, a case in which the manager's
type is known to the ocial. We solve for the manager's optimal eort level and the optimal
contract. As is well known in the literature, the social optimum dened by (5) is attainable. This
nding is summarized in Proposition 1.
PROPOSITION 1: When the manager's type, , is known to the ocial, the ocial will choose
 = 1 and V such that the manager receives his reservation utility, zero.26 After privatization, the
manager will have full ownership and exert socially optimal eort.
Proof of Proposition 1:
The ocial maximizes her prot function by choosing the optimal contract (();V ()) subject
to the manager's individual rationality (IR) or participation constraint:
max
f();V ()g
V () + W(();)
st  V () + U(();)  0:
where We have normalized the manager's reservation utility to zero for all types, and so the man-
ager's ex post utility is at least as great as the down payment. Substituting the constraint into the
objective function, we have the reformatted version of the ocial's problem, maxf()g W(();)+
U(();). This is exactly the social surplus. Solving this problem will give the solution  = 1
and e dened by the rst order condition 1 Ce = 0. The manager in this case exerts eort until
the marginal cost of eort equals the marginal benet from the project. In order to implement this
socially optimal eort level, the ocial privatizes the whole rm ( = 1), leaving herself with no
tail, while collecting a single initial payment from the manager, V = U(e;). This contract will
give the manager exactly the reservation utility of 0. Q.E.D.
26The reservation utility of the manager U() is dened as his opportunity cost, and it is assumed to be the same
(normalized to zero) for managers of all types. This would be true if the \quality" of the managers is rm-specic.
If so, when two managers of dierent qualities leave their rms, neither commands a wage premium relative to the
other in the outside market.
25B.2 Manager's Type Unknown
When the manager's type is unknown to the ocial, the nature of the problem changes. In this
case, the social optimum is no longer obtainable, and the ocial needs to design a contract to
obtain a second best solution. By the revelation principle, the ocial can restrict herself to linear
contracts of the following form: (i) the manager announces his type rst; (ii) the ocial oers a
contract that species an outcome [(^ );V (^ )] for each possible announcement ^  2 ; (iii) in every
state  2 , the manager nds it optimal to report the state truthfully.27
Solving for the optimal linear contract takes two steps. In the rst step, we solve the problem in
which the rm is privatized and the manager has made the initial down payment, V . The solution
to this problem will give the eort level, e(;), under arbitrary values of  and . The second
step in obtaining the optimal contract involves using the manager's eort function (e(;)) derived
from the rst step and solving for the ocial's optimal contract (();V ()). The solution to the
problem is second best, however, since the manager's eort is lower when a \tail" is left in the
ocials' hands. The behavior of the manager is summarized in Lemma 1.
LEMMA 1: When the manager's type is unknown to the ocial, the manager's ex post eort is
lower than the socially optimal level unless privatization leaves no tail with the ocial ( = 1).
Proof of Lemma 1:




Choosing eort, e, to maximize the manager's utility, the rst order condition is
   Ce(e;) = 0
Since the second order condition is satised for a maximum ( Cee < 0), there is a unique interior
maximum, e = e(;). This is the manager's eort function, an expression that relates the man-
ager's eort to his type and the contractual terms. The manager's maximized ex post expected
utility is given by U = e(;)   C(;). From the rst order condition, it can be seen that the
manager will exert less than the socially optimal level of eort unless  = 1. Since the manager only
cares about his share of the rm, he will not consider the total benet from the project. Incomplete
incentives will lead to a sub-optimal eort level. Q.E.D.
27We solve for the optimal contract by Mirrlees' First Order Approach (Mirrlees, 1971).
26Solving the manager's problem will generate the manager's eort function
e = e(;): (10)
Although managers exert sub-optimal eort levels when privatization leaves a tail ( < 1), it does
not mean that all privatized rms are equally inecient. The following lemma describes the factors
that increase or decrease the eort and utility levels of managers of privatized rms.
LEMMA 2: The manager's optimal eort level and the maximized ex post utility increase with the
manager's type  and with the prot share . Algebraically, e  @e=@ > 0 , e  @e=@ > 0,
U  @U=@ > 0, and U  @U=@ > 0. Furthermore, good managers are more responsive
than bad managers to an increase in , which can be seen from the sign of the cross derivative,
e  @2e
@@ > 0.
Proof of Lemma 2:
Totally dierentiate the manager's rst order condition    Ce(e;) = 0 with respect to  and
e, we get @e
@ = 1
Cee > 0. Totally dierentiate it with respect to  and e, we get @e
@ =  Ce
Cee > 0.
Using the envelop theorem, we can get U = e > 0 and U =  C > 0. We can further get
@2e
@@ =  Ceeee+Cee
(Cee)2 > 0, where, the last inequality holds given the assumption that Ceee  0 and
Cee  0 and at least one inequality holds. Q.E.D.
Having solved the manager's ex post problem and obtained the eort function 10, we will next
solve the ocial's problem for the optimal contracts. While the ocial does not know the exact type
of the manager, she knows the distribution of the manager. Besides facing the IR constraints as in
the symmetric information setup, the ocial also faces a set of incentive compatibility constraints
(ICs), which guarantee that the manager of type  chooses the \right" contract and does not have
an incentive to pretend to be the manager of another type, say, ^ . Given the expected level of eort
from each type of manager () for each contract (V;), the ocial solves the following problem by




 [V () + W(();)]f()d (11)
st : U(();)   V ()  U((^ );)   V (^ ) 8; ^  2  (12)
U(();)   V ()  0 8 2 : (13)
where equation 12 denes the incentive compatibility constraints, IC^  , and equation 13 denes
the individual rationality constraints, IR.
27While the problem dened by equations 11 to 13 is complicated since there are innitely many
constraints, it can be simplied in two ways. First, the IC^  constraints and the IR constraints
imply that the IR constraint of the worst type (IR) binds and all the other IRs are redundant.
Hence, the IR constraints reduce to one binding constraint: U(();)   V () = 0. Second, using
the First Order Approach rst proposed by Mirrlees (1971), the IC constraints can be simplied
to the manager's rst order condition (ICFOC) plus a monotonicity condition (M). These two
simplications are summarized in Lemmas 3 and 4.
LEMMA 3: In the solution to the ocial's problem, only the worst type's IR constraint, IR, binds,
and all the other IRs are redundant.
Proof of Lemma 3:
We will proceed with the proof by the following claims.
Claim 1 Given the prot share , the manager's eort level increases with his type, or e > 0;
and at the same time the manager's ex post maximized utility increases with type, or U 
 > 0.
Claim 1 follows from Lemma 2.
Claim 2 IR binds.
For any  2 , such that  > , we have
U(();)   V ()  U(();); V ()
> U(();)   V ()
 0
Where the rst inequality is IC, the second inequality follows since U(();) > U(();), and
the last inequality is IR. Thus, if IR is not binding, then IR is not binding. Since there is slack
in both IR and IR (for all  6= ), both constraints will hold when increasing V () (for all  6= )
and V () by . The ocial will be better o from this without violating any of the IC constraints.
Therefore, IR must bind.
Claim 3 IR (8 2  and  > ) is redundant. Again, we have
U(();)   V ()  U(();); V ()
> U(();)   V ()
= 0;
where we used Claim 2 to get the last equality. Thus, IR (8 2 and  > ) is redundant.
Thus, we have proved Lemma 3 by claim 1, 2, and 3. Q.E.D.
28LEMMA 4: The IC constraints can be reduced to two constraints: U(();)()   V() = 0
(ICFOC) and the monotonicity constraint, () > 0 (M).
Proof of Lemma 4 is skipped. See a detailed proof of Lemma 4 in Laont and Tirole (1993).




 [V () + W(();)]f()d (14)
st : U(();)()   V() = 0 for a.e. (15)
() > 0 for a.e. (16)
U(();)   V () = 0 (17)
Solving such a program generally requires optimal control techniques. However, we can use a
shortcut introduced in Laont and Tirole (1993). We initially ignore the monotonicity constraint
(equation 16), and solve the \relaxed" problem. Next, we check if monotonicity holds at the solution
to the relaxed problem. We show that the monotonicity property does hold and there exists an
equilibrium. In other words, it can be shown that when the ocial oers a menu of contracts to the
manager in equilibrium, a better manager always chooses a contract with better incentives while a
poorer manager always chooses a contract with poorer incentives. The results are summarized in
Proposition 2.
PROPOSITION 2: The monotonicity property holds at the solution to the relaxed ocial's opti-
mization problem that ignores the monotonicity constraint. The optimization problem dened by
equations (14)-(17) has a unique solution (V ();()). Furthermore, the best managers (type )
choose the socially optimal contract with () = 1.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Dene (;)  U(();)   V (), and dene G()  (;), where the rst  in  is the
\announced" type by the manager and the second  is the real type. Using the Envelope Theorem,
we can get G0() = U(();). Since U is dierentiable, we can rewrite G as G() = G() +
R 
 U(();)d. Since G() = U(();)   V () = 0, we get G() =
R 
 U(();)d. Now, we
can rewrite the ocial's objective function (equation 14) as
Z 















29We see from equation 19 that the ocial's objective function is divided into two parts: the social
surplus and the manager's informational rent. In order to separate good managers from bad
mangers, the ocial has to give up more rents to the good ones. The better the manager is, the
more rent he gets. The only mangers who do not earn any rents are those at the bottom (type
). Since this objective function is distorted downward from the social surplus, the solution to this














Using equation 21, equation 20 can be rewritten as
Z 





Let's dene virtual surplus J(;) = U(();)+W(();) U(();)
1 F()
f() . Thus, the ocial
will maximize the expected value of virtual surplus. The expected virtual surplus will be maximized
when J(;) is simultaneously maximized for almost every type . This maximization problem has
a unique solution () for each type  as shown below.
Rewrite J as J = e C(e;)+C
1 F






@ > 0 by Lemma 1, L()  1   Ce + Ce
1 F
f = 0. We know L(0) = 1 since the eort will
be 0 for  = 0. On the other hand, L(1) = Ce
1 F
f  0. Thus, there exists (at least) a solution
 2 [0;1] to the rst order condition.
Dierentiate L with respect to , then @L
@ = ( Cee +Cee
1 F
f ) @e
@ < 0. Thus, there is a unique
solution () to L = 0. Therefore, there is a unique maximum ().
Thus, the optimal () is dened such as




We need to check whether the monotonicity condition holds. A sucient condition for that is that
the SCP holds, or @2J
@@ > 0. This is proved below.
The rst half of J is the social surplus. Rewrite the social surplus as U(;) + W(;) =
e(;) C(e(;);), and dierentiate it with respect to , we get
@(U+W)
@ = (1 Ce) @e
@ = (1 ) @e
@
where Ce =  follows from the manager's rst order condition. Further dierentiating with respect
to , we get
@2(U+W)
@@ = (1   ) @2e
@@ > 0, where the last inequality follows from Lemma 2.
The second half of J is the informational rent, which is the product of U and 1=h(). Replac-






h(). Given assumptions (iii) and (iv),
@(U=h())
@ decreases with . Now, we can conclude that
@2J
@@ > 0.
Since the Single Crossing Property holds, at the optimum () increases with . Since the
monotonicity property holds, there is a unique equilibrium for the ocial's problem.
Last, when  = , F() = 1 and J(;) = S. Thus, the best managers have full incentives or
() = 1 and they exert socially optimal eort level. Q.E.D.
B.3 Comparative Statics
Given the problems of ocials and managers, we now demonstrate how the manager's eort changes
with the size of the down payment. In other words, We establish the nature of the relationship
between rm postprivatization performance and the size of the down payment. This relationship
can be derived by the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 3: In the equilibrium solution to 14-17, the prot sharing rule, (), and the
manager's down payment, V (), are uniquely determined by  and increase with . Consequently,
the manager's eort level, e, is determined jointly by the size of the down payment, V , and his type,
, and the manager's eort level increases with the size of the down payment, V . Algebraically,
these statements can be written as e = e(V;) and eV > 0.
This result allows us to replace  with V in equation 10 and dene the equation that will be
estimated empirically,
e = e(V;): (23)
Since we know that e increases with , and  increases with V , proposition 3 shows that the eort
level, e, increases with the size of the down payment, V . Finally, since expected rm performance
({for example, growth and prots) positively depends on e, equation 23 essentially provides the
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1 135 112 105 79 53 47
Privatized
2 0 23 30 56 82 88
Private
3 33 33 33 33 33 33
yThe sample is from a survey by the author in two provinces in Southern China: Jiangsu and Zhejiang Provinces in 1998.
1Government-owned in this sample are all township-owned rms.
2Privatized rms are those that shifted all or part of their shares from the government to the managers and employees
(about 70 percent of the shares to the managers in our sample).
3Private rms are those rms that were originally established as private.
34Table 2: The Buyout price, Base Value, and Buyout price of Privatized Firms in Rural China,
1994-1997. (N=88)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Buyout price to Number Buyout Base Asset The Preimum
base value ratio






(percent) (million (million (million (million
yuan) yuan) yuan) yuan)
0-0.2 21 0.78 7.16 18.06 -6.39 -0.32
0.21-0.5 14 1.48 4.65 11.67 -3.17 -0.29
0.51-0.75 13 1.57 2.39 6.80 -0.82 -0.12
0.76-1 13 3.09 3.80 16.61 -0.70 -0.03
Greater than 1 20 3.24 2.58 10.88 0.93 0.10
Less than 0
7 7 0.20 -0.69 6.22 0.89 0.18
1The ratio is calculated by dividing column 2 by column 3.
2The buyout price is the cash paid by the new owner to the government at the time of privatization.
3The base value is the book value of equity, which is the dierence of the book value of assets and the book value
of debt.
4The asset value is the book value of assets.
5The premium is the dierence of the buyout price and the base value, or column (5) = column (2) - column (3).
6The premium rate is the ratio of premium to the asset value, or column (6) = column (5) / column (4). The
premium rate is used as the normalized buyout price in the following tables.
7The BPBV ratio is negative because the book value of equity is negative.
35Table 3: Performance Measures of Heavily-Discounted, Moderately-Discounted and Premium-












Heavily-discounted rms (30 rms)
4
Preprivatization 0.780(0.153) 12.87(8.08)
Postprivatization 69.8(14.8) 0.749(0.131) 9.59(5.50)
Improvement
5 -0.031 -3.28
Moderately-discounted rms (26 rms)
4
Preprivatization 0.823(0.137) 9.28(4.55)
Postprivatization 75.4(16.2) 0.846(0.099) 13.19(8.18)
Improvement 0.023 3.91
Premium-paying rms (32 rms)
4
Preprivatization 0.796(0.120) 8.81(2.75)
Postprivatization 82.5(16.4) 0.833(0.098) 12.00(8.16)
Improvement 0.037 3.29
yThis table reports the means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of each group of rms for all four years except
that the manager's workload is only for the year 1997.
1Manager's workload is the number of hours the manager works per week.
2Accounts receivable management = 1 - inter-rm arrears/assets.
3Value added per worker = value added / number of workers.
4Heavily-discounted rms are those in which the buyout price is less than -0.2; moderately-discounted rms are those
in which the buyout price is between -0.2 and 0; premium-paying rms are those in which the managers have paid a
non-negative premium (the buyout price is positive or zero).
5Improvement is dened as: postprivatizaiton mean - preprivatization mean.
36Table 4: Ordinary Least Squares Regressions Using the \Full Specication" to Measure the Impact
of the Buyout price on Performance of Privatized Firms in Rural China, 1994-1997y
Dependent variable
(1) (2) (3)
Manager's Accounts receivable Value added per
workload
1 management
1 worker in log
1






Capital-labor ratio (log) 0.479***
(0.040)
Manager's attributes
Education 0.790 0.001 -0.027*
(0.872) (0.004) (0.016)
Experience 0.485 0.003 -0.006
(0.346) (0.002) (0.006)
Observations 80 160 167
R-squared 0.23 0.30 0.60
F-statistic 1.69* 1.59** 5.34***
yStandard errors are reported in parentheses. Signicance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent are represented by *, ** and ***.
All regressions include a constant and interactive terms of year indicators with provincial and sectoral indicators (not
reported).
1The rst regression uses a smaller sample since we observe the manager's workload only for the year 1997. For the last
two regressions, however, we use the sample of privatized rms for all postprivatization years.
37Table 5: Coecients of OLS, 2SLS and Firm Fixed-Eect Regressions Measuring the Impact of
the Buyout price on Performance of Privatized Firms in Rural China, 1994-1997y
Dependent variable
(1) (2) (3)
Estimator Manager's Accounts receivable Value added per
workload
1 management
2 worker in log
2
OLS (partial specication)
3 26.899*** 0.151*** 0.312**
(8.241) (0.042) (0.134)
OLS (full specication)






6 49.842* 0.375*** 0.817**
(26.290) (0.117) (0.395)
yStandard errors are reported in parentheses; signicance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent are represented by *, ** and ***.
1We observe the manager's workload only for the year 1997, so the OLS and 2SLS regressions have only 80 observations
and we cannot conduct the rm xed eect estimations for the manager's workload.
2For the dependent variables accounts receivable management and value added per worker, we have 167 observations for
OLS and 2SLS and 298 observations for rm xed-eect model.
3The partial specication includes the rm size and the manager's attributes as other independent variables. The value
added per worker equation also includes the log employment and log capital-labor ratio.
4In regressions using full specication, besides the variables in the partial specication, we also include interactive terms
of provincial and sector indicators with year indicators.
5The 2SLS regressions use the partial specication and the tted value of buyout price predicted by regression (1) in
Table 6. We conducted a Hausman exclusion restriction test, a Lagrange multiplier test for the instruments. The chi-
square distributed test statistics with 2 degrees of freedom, is N  R
2, where N is the number of observations, and R
2
is the measure of goodness of t of the regression of the residuals from these regressions on the two IVs. (See footnote.)
All three regressions pass the test with the p-value of the tests ranging from 0.55 to 0.99.
6In the rm xed-eect estimations, we include rm indicators and also postprivatization indicators.
38Table 6: Ordinary Least Squares Regression (and the First Stage of the Two-Stage Least Squares
Regression) Explaining the Buyout price of Privatized Firms in Rural China, 1994-1997.





Number of rms (IV) -0.010* -0.011*
(0.005) (0.006)
Number of market destinations (IV) -0.007*** -0.006*
(0.003) (0.003)















yStandard errors are reported in parentheses. Signicance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent are represented by
*, ** and ***.
1The predicted buyout price from the partial model is used in the second-stage regression. (see Table 5, row
3)
2The full specication, besides all the independent variables in the partial specication, also includes the
provincial and sectoral indicators (not reported).
3The null hypothesis of the test is the sum of the coecients on the two IVs (number of rms and number
of market destinations) is zero.
39Table 7: Ordinary Least Squares Regression Explaining the Buyout price of Privatized Firms in
Rural China, 1994-1997.
Dependent variable: Normalized buyout price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Information asymmetries variables
Number of rms -0.009* -0.010** -0.009* -0.009**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Number of market destinations -0.006*** -0.005** -0.007*** -0.006**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Wealth constraints
1 -0.139*** -0.102* -0.118**
(0.051) (0.052) (0.051)
Risk level
2 -0.011** -0.010** -0.011**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Assets (lagged) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 86 86 86 86 86
R-squared 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.21
F-statistic 3.44** 4.32*** 3.64*** 3.76*** 4.25***
yStandard errors are reported in parentheses. Signicance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent are represented by
*, ** and ***.
1Wealth constraint is an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the manager is wealth constrained when buying a
rm.
2Risk level is the standard deviation of the rm's sales growth.
40Table 8: Group Fixed-Eect Regressions Using the Whole Panel Including Private and Government-
owned Firms Explaining the Impact of the Buyout price on Performancey
Dependent variable
(1) (2) (3)
Manager's Accounts receivable value added per
workload management worker in log













Premium-paying 11.930*** 0.055** 0.200**
(3.804) (0.022) (0.086)
Moderately-discounted 5.905 0.059** 0.193**
(4.169) (0.024) (0.093)






Capital-labor ratio (log) 0.328***
(0.026)
Manager's attributes
Education 1.088* -0.005* -0.001
(0.590) (0.002) (0.011)
Experience 0.408* 0.001 0.015***
(0.236) (0.001) (0.004)
Observation 167 575 567
R-squared 0.19 0.16 0.38
F-statistics 2.17*** 2.05*** 6.30***
yStandard errors are reported in parentheses; signicance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent are represented by *, ** and
***. All regressions include interactive terms of year indicators with provincial and sectoral indicators (not reported).
1Privatized rms are divided into three groups by the magnitude of the normalized buyout price: premium-paying,
moderately-discounted and heavily-discounted rms. (See Table 3 and Table A3). We have an indicator for each of
the groups for their postprivatization years. In order to control for unobservables (or selection bias), we also divide
the preprivatization years of privatized rms into three groups by the buyout price: premium-paying, moderately-
discounted and heavily-discounted rms.
41Table 9: Results of Hypothesis Tests Examining Improvement of Privatized Firms over Time and
Comparison with Private and Government-owned Firms, 1994-1997y
(1) (2) (3)
F-test/t-test to test Manager's Accounts receivable Value added
equivalence of performance
1 workload management per worker
Equivalence of private rms
and premium-paying privatized rms
(row 1 vs. row 5)
F-statistic 0.36 0.52 0.03
p-value 0.55 0.47 0.87
Equivalence of government-owned rms and
heavily-discounted privatized rms (row 7)
t-statistic 0.062 1.30 0.465
p-value 0.95 0.193 0.642
Equivalence of premium-paying rms and heavily-
discounted privatized rms postprivatization (row
5 vs. row 7)
F-statistic 8.29*** 10.50*** 6.19***
p-value 0.005 0.001 0.01
ySignicance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent are represented by *, ** and ***. All tests are based on regressions in Table 8.
1The null hypotheses are the coecients in the two rows (from Table 8) specied are equal.
42Table A1: Sectoral Distribution of Sample Firms in Jiangsu and Zhejiang Provinces, China,
1994-1997y
Government-owned rms Privatized rms Private rms
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Metal mining 1 2 0 0 0 0
Metal processing 2 4 10 11 6 18
Construction material 3 6 2 2 1 3
Chemicals 9 19 17 19 3 9
Machinery 4 9 28 32 8 25
Electronics 7 15 5 6 3 9
Textile and clothing 14 30 18 20 8 24
Food and agricultural product processing 2 4 3 3 2 6
Miscellaneous light manufacturing industries 5 11 5 6 2 6
yThe sectors are based on the 2-digit SIC code adjusted for Chinese classication.



















1The exchange rate is: 1 dollar = 8.3 yuan
44Table A3: Denition of Variables
Variable Name Denition
Performance Measures
Manager's workload number of hours the manager works per week
Prot rate net prot / sales
Inter-rm arrears rate rm trade arrears / assets
Accounts receivable management (1 - inter-rm arrears rate)
Value added sales - materials cost
Value added per worker value added / number of workers
logy natural log of value added per worker
Firm Valuation
Base value book value of assets - book value of debt
Premium buyout price - base value
Normalized buyout price (premium rate) buyout price premium / assets
Premium-paying indicator an indicator variable which equals 1 if the normalized buyout price is non-
negative and equals 0 otherwise
Moderately-discounted indicator an indicator variable which equals 1 if buyout price is between -0.2 and 0
and equals 0 otherwise
Heavily-discounted indicator an indicator variable which equals 1 if buyout price is below -0.2 and equals
0 otherwise
Ownership indicators
Private rm an indicator variable which equals 1 if the rm is private and equals 0
otherwise
Preprivatization an indicator variable which equals 1 if the rm is a privatized rm but has
not been privatized in the current year and equals 0 otherwise
Postprivatization an indicator variable which equals 1 if the rm is a privatized rm and has
been privatized in the current year and equals 0 otherwise
Preprivatization premium-paying an indicator variable which equals 1 if both the preprivatization indicator
and premium-paying indicator equal 1, and equals 0 otherwise
Preprivatization moderately-discounted an indicator variable which equals 1 if both the preprivatization indicator
and moderately-discounted indicator equal 1, and equals 0 otherwise
Preprivatization heavily-discounted an indicator variable which equals 1 if both the preprivatization indicator
and heavily-discounted indicator equal 1, and equals 0 otherwise
Postprivatization premium-paying an indicator variable which equals 1 if both the postprivatization indicator
and premium-paying indicator equal 1, and equals 0 otherwise
Postprivatization moderately-discounted an indicator variable which equals 1 if both the postprivatization indicator
and moderately-discounted indicator equal 1, and equals 0 otherwise
Postprivatization heavily-discounted an indicator variable which equals 1 if both the postprivatization indicator
and heavily-discounted indicator equal 1, and equals 0 otherwise
45Table A3: Denition of Variables (continued)
Variable Name Denition
Firm size measures
Employment number of employees in the rm
Sales gross income from sales
Assets value of total assets
logL natural log of employment
logk natural log of capital labor ratio
Manager's attributes
Education years of schooling
Experience number of years as the rm's manager
Measures of information asymmetry
Number of TEs number of township government-owned rms in each township
Number of market destinations number of market destinations (counties) to which a rm sells its output
Wealth constraints an indicator variable which equals 1 if the manager is wealth-constrained
when buying a rm
Risk level the standard deviation of a rm's sales growth
Other control variables
Sector indicators 8 industry indicators (see Table A1)
Provincial indicators in indicator variable which equals 1 for Zhejiang Province and equals 0 for
Jiangsu Province
Year indicators three year indicators for 1995, 1996 and 1997
46